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1. Introduction 
 
It seems plausible that versions of business cycle models that exhibit a positive co-
movement between consumption and labor may also exhibit indeterminacies. A 
noteable attempt to link between indeterminacies and the positive co-movement 
between consumption and labor is found in Benhabib and Wen (2004).  They show that 
under indeterminacy, aggregate demand shocks are able to explain not only aspects of 
actual fluctuations that standard RBC models predict fairly well, but also aspects of 
actual fluctuations that standard RBC models cannot explain, such as the hump-shaped, 
trend reverting impulse responses to transitory shocks found in US output [Cogley and 
Nason (1995)] the large forecastable movements and comovements of output, 
consumption and hours [Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)] and the fact that 
consumption appears to lead output and investment over the business cycle. 
Indeterminacy arises in their model due to capacity utilization and mild increasing 
returns to scale. Subsequent literature, such as Linnemann (2008) and Meng and Yip 
(2008), contributes to this literature by improving our intuition as to the causes of 
indeterminacy.  
In Linnemann (2008), equilibrium indeterminacy can arise in a neoclassical growth 
model when the government continuously balances its budget through adjustments of 
the income tax rate1. Linnemann (2008) puts emphasis on a steady state in which 
leisure is constant although consumption may grow. In this case, complementarity 
between consumption and employment emerges as a stabilizing mechanism. Meng and 
Yip (2008) relax the restrictions commonly imposed on the magnitude of capital 
externalities in one-sector models with Cobb-Douglas technology. They find that 
indeterminacy can arise either if utility is separable in consumption and leisure and 
                                                 
1
  The reasons for indeterminacy under such policy are discussed extensively in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(1997). 
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there are negative capital externalities; or:  utility is non-separable and the social 
elasticity of production with respect to capital is greater than one. In addition, with 
Cobb-Douglas technology they show that leisure must be a normal good for 
indeterminacy to occur [that is, the presence of income effects on the demand for 
leisure is a necessary condition for indeterminacy]. There is no restriction in meng and 
Yip (2008) analysis on whether consumption and labor are complements or substitutes. 
At this time the literature provide no clue as to the direction of causality where 
equilibrium is indeterminate and consumption co-moves with labor, so it remains a 
matter of faith. Either, as in Benhabib and Wen (2004) under indeterminacy, aggregate 
demand shocks explain the large forecastable movements and comovements of output, 
consumption and hours, or , complementarities between consumption and labor are 
responsible both to indeterminacies a-la Benhabib and Wen (2004) and to the positive 
co-movement found in the data. It should be noted however, that the assumption of 
additive separability of utilities with respect to consumption and leisure has been 
typically made more for convenience than from conviction. Basu and Kimball (2002) 
and Kimball and Shapiro (2008) reject additive separability and arrive at the view that 
the utility function exhibits complementarity between consumption and labor by 
considering facts about lung-run labor supply. Hall (2008) and Raj (2006) also share 
this view. Their view also points to predictions in the context of Benhabib and Wen 
(2004). For example, complementarity between consumption and labor provide a 
straightforward channel for monetary policy to cause an increase in output. When labor 
and consumption are complementary, the increase in consumption is enough to cause 
output to increase as long as interest and wealth effects are not too large.  
    Note that in most RBC models it is implicit that the government seeks to stabilize 
the conomy. Among the goals of the policy stands firmly the intent to eliminate 
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fluctoations due to self fulfillinf expectations. In such a case, consumption-labor 
complementarity can overturn policy outcomes.  
 
This paper puts emphasis on characterizing policy rules that potentially subdue the 
self fulfilling fluctutions that come to pass from the complementarity between 
consumption and hours worked. It maintains, however, the assumption that the 
consolidated government operates a balanced budget. In simple settings the conditions 
under which monetary policy can lead to indeterminacy under a balanced budget 
requirement are well understood: active interest rules within a balanced budget 
requirement generate determinacy and passive rules generate indeterminacy. Prominent 
papers in this literature include Benhabib et. al. (2001) [who discuss monetary policy 
rules where money and consumption are Edgeworth complements and the policy 
affects households allocation at the private level between financial assets and capital 
assets via an arbitrage channel] and Huang and Meng (2007) [who consider an effect of 
policy on households via the arbitrage channel and an effect on firms via a pricing 
channel in a model with monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity]. This 
paper contributes to existing literature by considering an additional channel: a labor 
channel, where consumption and labor are assumed Edgeworth complements. 
Accordingly, it is assumed throughout that the utility function is non-separable in 
consumption and leisure and, in line with Hall (2008), that consumption and labor are 
complements. The upshot of this paper is that controlling the real rate of interest is a 
necessary condition for the determination of expectations. The model calibrated to the 
U.S economy provides evidence that: a) operating an interest rate rule such that the 
expected real rate of interest is above its steady state level during booms and below its 
steady state level during recessions is sufficient to induce equilibrium determinacy; b) 
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operating an interest rate rule such that the expected real rate of interest is constant at 
all times is sufficient to induce equilibrium determinacy; c) a non-monetary version of 
the model is expected to exhibit indeterminacies as demonstrated in Meng and Yip 
(2008)2.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 illustrates a model with 
endogenous labor-leisure choice where consumption and labor are Edgeworth 
complements. This model is extended to include a concave investment technology and 
a cash-in-advance constraint. The cash-in-advance constraint is introduced so as to 
mimic the role of complementarity between consumption and money. Section 3 
contains local stability analysis with the least amount of restrictions over the functional 
forms of utilities and production technology. In section 4 long run elasticities and deep 
structural parameters are calibrated to the U.S. economy. Results show that for a 
plausible range of parameters, under a requirement that the consolidated budget is 
balanced throughout, local-real-determinacy is ensured where monetary policy is 
neutral or active. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
2
 This version of the article does not formally prove this conjecture. 
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2. A Model with Endogenous Labor-Leisure Choice and Frictions in 
Investment 
 
It is assumed throughout the paper that the consolidated government runs a balanced 
budget within which the central bank operates an interest rate feedback rule. Dupor 
(2001) and Benhabib et al. (2001) discuss  the issue of local real determinacy in a 
continuous time model where the monetary authority sets a nominal interest rate as a 
function of the instantaneous rate of inflation. The policy considered here follows this 
line and is also in one line with the forward-looking policy considered by Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) in their discrete-time 
models3.  
Money enters the economy via a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption. 
Following Benhabib et. al (2002), and to avoid steady state multiplicity, attention is 
restricted to equilibria with a strictly positive nominal interest rate. This approach 
receives substantial support in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)4. Finally, to keep the 
focus on labor channel effects and to abstract from cost-channel effects it is assumed 
throughout that nominal prices are flexible and that markets are perfectly competitive. 
 
2.1. The Economic Environment 
Households – The model is a continuous time, flexible price version of Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007) with endogenous labor-leisure choice and endogenous 
investment. The economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely long-lived 
                                                 
3
 As we know, the instantaneous rate of inflation in a continuous-time setting is the right-derivative of 
the logged price level and thus, the discret-time counterpart of a countinuous-time policy rule that sets 
the interest rate in response to the instanteneous rate of inflation is characterized by forward-looking 
policy that responds to expected future inflation. 
 
4
 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) show that welfare is maximized where inflation target is close to zero. 
Consequently, the nominal rate of interest at the efficient steady state is positive. 
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households, with measure one.  The representative household’s lifetime utility is given 
by 
)1(                                                            
dtLcueU t )1,(
0
−= ∫
∞
−ρ
  
where ρ>0 denotes the rate of time preference, c denotes consumption. It is assumed 
that households are endowed with one unit of leisure. L and Ll −= 1 denote labor and 
leisure, respectively.  u(c,l) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments 
and concave where consumption and leisure are Edgeworth substitutes ( ucl<0). We 
also assume that ucc-ucluc/ul<0 and ull-uclul/uc<0 which implies that consumption and 
leisure are normal goods. Apart from being plausible, this assumption is imperative in 
order to give rise to indeterminacies a-la Meng and Yip (2008). 
It is also assumed that consumption and money balances are Edgeworth complements. 
To keep the analysis simple and tractable while maintaining the consumption-money 
complementarity assumption, money enters the economy via a cash-in-advance 
constraint on consumption5. In addition to money, households can store wealth in 
government-issued non-indexed bonds and physical capital. Bonds pay a net nominal 
interest of R>0. Capital is either utilized for production or consumed paying an 
adjustment cost. The household’s budget constraint is therefore described as:  
)2( 
     
                       τππ −+−−=+++ ),()( LkfmbRmbIc && 
where I is the flow of investment, b is the real value of government bonds, m is the real 
value of money balances, k is the stock of capital, τ is a real lump-sum tax and π is the 
rate of inflation. Note that all variables are time-dependent (the time argument is 
                                                 
5
 Feenstra (1986) demonstrates a functional equivalence between using real money as an argument of the 
utility function and entering money into a liquidity constraint. Specifically, he argues that cash-in-
advance constraints can be viewed as a special case of a utility function that includes real balances with 
zero elasticity of substitution between goods and money. 
  7
omitted to keep notation simple). Finally it is assumed that the function, f(k,L), is twice 
differentiable, strictly increasing and displays a constant returns to scale production 
technology. We further assume that factor markets are competitive, thus, production 
factors are paid their marginal product. By defining mba +≡  as the real value of non-
capital wealth the household’s budget constraint becomes:  
)3( 
              
        τπ −−−++−−= IcwLrkRmaRa )(& 
Where r and w denote capital rent and labor compensation, respectively. The 
household’s consumption is then subject to the cash-in-advance constraint 
∫
+
≤=
Tt
t
mdsscTF )()(
 . Normalizing T to 1 the CIA constraint can be approximated as:6
 
 
)4(                                      
Finally, assuming that the stock of capital depreciates at a rate δ, the household’s 
lifetime maximization problem becomes 
mc
kIk
IcwLrkRmaRa
ts
dtLcueMax t
≤
−=
−−−++−−=
−∫
∞
−
δϕ
τπ
ρ
)(
)(
..
)1,(
0
&
&
 
With the following no-Ponzi-game condition  
and where ϕ(I) is increasing and concave with ϕ(0)=0. This specification suggests that 
                                                 
6This version of CIA is similar to Rebelo and Xie (1999). Formally, the cash-in-advance constraint is 
∫
+
≤=
Tt
t
mdsscTF )()( . A Taylor series expansion gives L& ++= )(T
2
1)(T)( 2 tctcTF  and so (4) 
can be interpreted as a first-order approximation. Finally, and without loss of generality to subsequent 
analysis, T is normalized to 1. 
 
mc ≤
0
0
=+∫ π−−∞→ )]t(k)t(a[eLim
t
ds)]s()s(R[
t
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adjustments to the stock of capital are costly and that adjustment costs are increasing 
with investment and convex7.  
The household chooses sequences of {c,I,L,m} so as to maximize its lifetime utility, 
taking as given the initial stock of capital k(0), and the time paths of τ,R, and π. 
An optimal program must choose c,m,L and I  so as to maximize the current-
value Hamiltonian
[ ] [ ] )()()()1,(1 cmkIIcwLrkRmaRLcuH −+−+−−−++−−+−≡ ξδϕµτπλ  Thus, 
the necessary conditions for an interior maximum of the household’s problem are 
)5( 
  
                                                       ξλ +=− )1,( Lcuc  
)6(                                                         )('
1
Iϕλ
µ
=   
)7(                                                  
λ
)1,( Lcu
w l
−
=
 
)8(                                                             Rλξ = 
)9(                                                                              0)(;0 =−≥ cmξξ 
Where λt and µt (in the current-value Hamiltonian the time subscripts are omitted to 
simplify notation) are co-state variables interpreted as the marginal valuation of a unit 
of financial assets and installed capital, respectively, and ξt is a Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the CIA constraint.  
Second, the co-state variables must evolve according to the law 
                                                 
7
 In general, macroeconomic continuous time modeling could be misleading in the sense that it does 
not correctly approximate the behavior of the discrete time model of arbitrarily small periods. Carlstrom 
and Fuesrt (2005) point out that modeling policy issues in continuous time could end up with conclusions 
that are opposite to the conclusions drawn from a discrete-time counterpart of the model.  They attribute 
the opposite conclusions to the difference in timing in the no-arbitrage condition of investing in bonds 
and capital between the two settings: while the continuous-time setting entails a contemporaneous no-
arbitrage condition, a similar no-arbitrage condition in the discrete-time setting involves only future 
variables which bring a zero eigenvalue into the linearized dynamic system. One way to overcome 
contemporaneous features of no-arbitrage in continuous time macroeconomic models that enter at the 
"back door" as the period length gets shorter is to introduce adjustment costs to capital. For proof see 
Gliksberg (2009). 
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)10(                                                     ][ R−+= πρλλ&     
)11(                                                 µδρλ )(µ ++−= r&                             
Since attention is restricted to steady states with non negative inflation targets, the 
nominal rate of interest is positive near the steady state. As a result, equation (8) 
implies that ξ , the Lagrange multiplier associated with the cash-in-advance constraint 
in non zero. It then follows from (9) that m=c and from (8) and (5) that 
)1()1,( RLcuc +=− λ . The interpretation is simple: near a steady state with positive 
nominal interest rate holding money entails opportunity costs. Thus, equilibrium 
amount of (real) money that minimizes the opportunity cost associated with money 
holding while still satisfying condition (4) is m=c. Accordingly, the law of motion for 
the real value of financial assets becomes 
)12(                   τπ −−+−++−= IRcwLrkaRa )1()(&              
   
and the law of motion for capital is  
)13( 
      
kIk δϕ −= )(&   
We study equilibria close to the steady state and we assume that fiscal policy is passive 
[according to Leeper (1991)], therefore, the transversality condition holds. 
Let η denote the ratio between the two co-state variables, . Accordingly, 
, and thus, substituting in equations (10) - (11) and rearranging yields the 
evolution of η:           
)14( 
                                       
)(),( δπηη +−+−= RLkf k&                                                                                   
Equations (10), (13) – (14) fully describe the optimal instantaneous decision of the 
representative household as it takes the time paths of τ, R, and π as given.  
λ
µ
η ≡
λ
λ
η
λ
µ
η
&&
& −=
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The Government 
Following Benhabib et. al. (2001) it is assumed that monetary policy takes the form of 
an interest-rate feedback rule whereby the nominal interest rate is set as an increasing 
function of instantaneous inflation. Specifically, it is assumed that  
)15(                                                   )(πRR = 
Where R(π) is continuous, non-decreasing and strictly positive, and there exists a steady-
state, )π*( , where  ρπ* −>  such that ** πρ)πR +=( . It is further assumed that the 
monetary authority reacts to an increase in the rate of inflation by increasing the nominal 
rate of interest. That is, 0( >
∂
∂ )πR *
π
.  Following the terminology of Leeper (1991), the 
government operates under a passive fiscal policy and levy lump-sum taxs. It is assumed 
that government disbursements include purchases and interest payments over the 
outstanding debt. Thus, the consolidated government’s nominal budget constraint is  
)16( 
                                           
τPBMRBPg ++=+ &&
                                           
                    
 
where B and M denote nominal stocks of bonds and money, respectively, P is the level 
of nominal prices, and g denotes government purchases. The central bank imposes the 
desired interest rate by controlling the price of riskless nominal bonds and exchanging 
money for bonds at any quantities demanded at that price. In that sense, the nominal rate 
of interest is exogenous and the M and B are endogenous. Simple algebraic 
manipulations of equation (16) yield that a ≡m+b evolves according to: 
)17(                                               )()( gRmaRa −−−−= τπ& 
Equilibrium – In equilibrium, the goods market, the factors market and the assets 
market clear. Equations (10), (13) – (14) imply that the evolution of λ,η and k fully 
  11
describe a rational expectations equilibrium given the time paths of τ, R, and π as 
(exogenously) given. Thus, our discussion will focus on whether the representative 
agent can construct an isolated equilibrium trajectory in the (λ,η,k) space given a 
predetermined level of k and a common knowledge with respect to the stance of 
monetary policy.  
Conjecture that an isolated equilibrium exists. Then, equations (18), (19) and (20) 
describe instantaneous equilibrium in the goods market, labor market and the assets 
market respectively: 
)18(                               gkIkckLkf ++= ),,(),,()),,(,( ηληληλ                                     
)19(                      
λ
ηληλ
ηλ
)),,(1),,,(()),,(,( kLkcukLkf lL
−
=
 
)20(                     )),,((1
)),,(1),,,((
kR
kLkcuc
ηλπ
ηληλ
λ
+
−
= 
also, Equation (6) demonstrates that the rate of investment depends only on η .  Thus, 
)21( 
                                                         
        )()('
1
η
ϕ
η II
I
=⇒= 
 
2.2. Equilibrium Dynamics  
Partially deriving equations (18)-(20) with respect to λ,η and k [appendix A.1] yields 
10 equations with 10 unknowns. Solving this set yield:
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)(
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1
2
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I
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−
=
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−=
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=
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=
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λ
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λ
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π
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π
π
η
η
π
λ
λ
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Thus, the dynamics of all the variables in the economy can be described by ),,( kηλ
which evolve according to: 
[ ] τηληλπηληλπηλπ
ηλ
ηλη
ηλλ
−−−=
=
=
=
),,(),,(),,(,,),,(
),,(
),,(
),,(
kmk)(Rkak)(k)(Ra
kHk
kG
kF
&
&
&
&
 
where  
)23( 
                            
)],,(),,([),,( k)(RkkF ηλπηλπρληλ −+≡ 
)24( ]),,(),,([),,,(),,( δηλπηλπηηληλ +−+−≡ kk)(Rk)L(kfkG k 
)25( 
                                                      
kIkH δηϕηλ −≡ ))((),,( 
and where the transversality condition is [ ] 0]),,([0 ),,(),,( =+∫ −−∞→ kkaeLim
t
dskk)(R
t ηληλπηλπ   
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3. Equilibrium and Local Real Determinacy 
Linear models with infinite horizon generally admit infinitely many rational 
expectations solutions. Consequently, some selection devices are needed to narrow the 
set of applicable solutions. This paper emphasizes a selection device according to 
Evans and Guesnerie (2005) who show that the saddle-path solution is bound to be 
selected from a multiple of applicable solutions. 
Definition - Equilibrium displays Local-Real-Determinacy (LRD) if there exists a 
Saddle-Path stable solution in the ),,( kηλ space.8 Otherwise equilibrium displays Non-
LRD. 
 
Local Real Determinacy   
 Equations (5), (7), (23)–(25) imply that in the steady state πρπ **)( +=R , 
δρ
η
πρ
λ
+
=
++
−
=
),(
,
1
)1,( ***
*
**
*
LkfLcu kc
, 
** ))(( kI δηϕ = , 
*
**
* )1,(
λ
Lcu
w l
−
=  [asterisk 
throughout denote steady state levels]. Also, a linear approximation of the dynamic 
system near the steady state ),,( *** kηλ  is obtained through the system 
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
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=
*
*
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)(''
)('0
)1()1()1(
)1()1()1(
2**
*
****************
*********
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X
A
I
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RLffRLfRLf
RRR
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η
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where A is the Jacobian of equations (23)-(25) and *πR  denotes π
π
∂
∂ )(R
 at *π .  
                                                 
8Isolated equilibria that are not saddle-path stable are ignored. Evans and Guesnerie (2005) show that 
rational agents coordinate on saddle-path solutions. LRD also excludes non-isolated equilibria that either 
converge to the steady state or cycle (both periodically and non-periodically) near the steady state. 
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The solution of the characteristic equation of A depends on *πR  that exhibits the stance 
of monetary policy near the steady state. Note that  
)1,()1,(
ˆ
1
)1()(
******
2**
*
*******
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*
*
*
2**
*
*******
***
**
321
)(''
)('
0
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And that  
*******
321 ))(1()( ηληπ ρπλπηθθθ LfR kLATrace −+−−=++ =  
Where 3,2,1, =iiθ  denote the eigenvalues of A. Thus, with one predetermined variable, 
a necessary condition for LRD is that 0)ˆ(1
*
*
321 <
−
−= BDet
R
R
π
πθθθ .  
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4. Solution, Calibration, and  Computation 
According to equations (5) and (7) the shadow real wage as seen by the household is 
)1()1,(
)1,(),( R
Lcu
Lcu
Lcw
c
l +
−
−
= .  
Define the elasticity of the wage with respect to consumption when labor is held 
constant as 
c
cc
l
cl
u
u
c
u
u
c
c
LcwLc −=
∂
∂
≡ )ln(
)),(ln(),(ζ
 and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution for consumption ),( Lcs and the consumption-constant elasticity of labor 
supply ),( Lch  by  
c
cc
u
u
c
Lcs
−≡),(
1
  and  
c
cl
l
ll
u
u
L
u
u
L
L
Lcw
Lch
+−=
∂
∂
≡ )ln(
)),(ln(
),(
1
.  
Finally define )1()1,(
)1,(),(),( R
Lcu
Lcu
c
L
c
LLcwLc
c
l +
−
−
=≡ω
 and note that 
R
Lcuc
+
−
=
1
)1,(
λ
 
Since the Hessian 





llcl
clcc
uu
uu
is symmetric, the three elasticities, ),( Lcζ ),( Lcs and 
),( Lch , plus ),( Lcω and λ determine all local first and second derivatives of the 
function )1,( Lcu − apart from overall scale of felicity which has no economic meaning. 
Accordingly, simple algebra obtains
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where asterisk denote steady state levels9. A similar exercise obtains that 
2*
*
*
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*
*
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*
*
*
*
*
*
* ;;;)1(;1
)1(
L
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Lk
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k
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k
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α
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−==−=
−
=
−
−+
=   
                                                 
9
 The utility is separable in its arguments iff 1** =ζs whereas 1** <ζs
 
imply that consumption and 
labor are complements. 
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(proof in appendix A.2)   
and 
( )
22*
2*
*
*
*
***
)1(
)1)(1()1()1(2)('';))(1()(';)(
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(proof in appendix A.3)   
Where α,δ,ρ,ω,ζ,h,s  are obtained from estimates of stationary time series.10, 
At this point, finding the restrictions on monetary policy so as to induce LRD is straight 
forward: First, steady state levels ***** ,,,, llclcclc uuuuu ,
*****
,,,, LLkLkkk ffffI ,
)(''),('),( *** III ϕϕϕ  are substituted into equation (22) to obtain  
**********
,,,,,,, πππ ηληληλη kkk LLLcccI that depend only on the long run estimate of 
α,δ,ρ,ω,ζ,h,s . Then, steady state levels 
)('',,,,,,,, *********** ILLLcccI kkk ϕπππ ηληληλη  are substituted into the Jacobian 
matrix A.  
 
Table 1 – Structural Parameters and Elasticities 
Parameter Range Description 
s   [0.2,0.5] Elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
h [1,2] Consumption-constant elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
wages  
ζ   [0.8,1.2] Labor-constant elasticity of wages with respect to consumption  
ω   [0.8,0.9] Long-run ratio of wage income to consumption 
α   0.3 Capital share of output 
ρ 0.03 Rate of subjective time preference 
δ 0.1 Rate of capital depreciation 
 
                                                 
10 ϕ''(I)<0. Thus, the values of α,δ,ρ,ω  should be calibrated so as to ensure that ϕ''(I) is negative at the 
steady-state investment. Specifically, 
αδδρ
δρα
ωϕ
−+
+−
<⇔<
))(1(0)('' *I   
. 
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According to the theory, ω equals labor income divided by consumption expenditure. 
Taking nominal wages and salaries from the U.S National Income Accounts and 
dividing by nominal spending on non-durable consumption and services gives an 
average ratio of 0.9. Basu and Kimball (2002) use the prices as perceived by consumer 
so they define ω using after-tax wage. Thus they use ω=0.8 as their preferred value. It 
should be noted however, that in the present context, results are robust to ω as long as 
αδδρ
δρα
ω
−+
+−
<
))(1(
 which is essential to ensure that the investment technology is 
concave. For that matter, and given the assumed values of α,ρ,δ, ω must be less than 
0.91. 
For all values specified in Table 1 0)ˆ( >BDet  which imply that the Taylor principle is 
necessary to ensure local real determinacy. Furthermore, the upshot of explicitly 
solving the characteristic equation of A for values of Table 1 is that an active policy 
stance, 1* >πR , induces two unstable eigenvalues and one stable eigenvalue and hence 
local-real-determinacy. A neutral policy stance, 1* =πR , brings about one stable 
eigenvalue, one zero eigenvalue and one unstable eigenvalue and hence local-real-
determinacy. A passive policy stance, 1* <πR , brings about two stable eigenvalues and 
one unstable eigenvalue and hence equilibrium is Non-LRD11. 
  
                                                 
11
 Methematica© code used to calculate the results is available at request from the author. 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper considers local real determinacy (LRD) as a prerequisite for 
macroeconomic stability. LRD was examined under a simple forward-looking interest 
rate feedback rule and a passive fiscal-policy with non distorting taxation where both 
labor supply and investment are endogenous. The focus is on labor market dynamics 
that derive from complementarities between consumption and hours worked. The 
model is specified so as to apply for a wide range of utilities through transformation 
from ethereal expressions to long run elasticities. 
 The model gives rise to a labor market channel. This channel of monetary 
policy, in an economy calibrated to the US economy, was found to act together with the 
arbitrage channel of monetary policy. The Taylor principle is shown to induce LRD. 
Furthermore, a neutral policy stance, such that the expected real rate of interest is 
constant in and off the steady state, achieves a similar upshot.  
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Appendix A 
 
A.1  
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A.2 
It is assumed throughout that a large number of firms, each of which produces a 
homogenous commodity using a constant returns-to-scale production-technology, 
operate in a competitive setup of markets for goods and factors. Accordingly, 
LLkfkLkfLkf Lk ),(),(),( +=  . And, the capital share of output is 
α=
+ LLcwkLkf
kLkf
k
k
),(),(
),(
.  
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Taking partial derivatives of both sides of LLkfkLkfLkf Lk ),(),(),( +=  and 
assuming the market clearing conditions for goods and factor markets, we obtain a set 
of equations 
IcLkf
k
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L
LcwLkf
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Lkf
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Lkf
kLkf
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LL
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Of which the solutions with respect to I and the partial derivatives of f are 
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=    where 
*
**
c
Lw
≡ω  and asterisk denote steady state levels 
 
A.3 
A second order Taylor expansion of the investment technology ϕ(I):  
2***** ))((''
2
1))((')()( IIIIIIII −+−+= ϕϕϕϕ  Specifically it is used to approximate 
ϕ(0)=0. Rearranging the Taylor expansion for ϕ(0)=0 implies that 
2*
***
* )()('2)(''
I
IIII ϕϕϕ −= . Substituting in 
αω
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